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ARTICLE
CONTEXTUALIZING THE SOFTWARE PATENT DEBATE IN CANADA:
A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Conrad Delbert Seaman*

There has been ongoing international debate regarding the patentability of
software for at least 15 years. Despite being bound by international laws,
which deal directly with the patentability of software (TRIPS), individual
countries continue to justify vastly different legislative and practical patent
regimes in this field of innovation. In a very traditional and conservative
fashion Canada has placed itself carefully on the fence in this debate adopting
an approach which falls somewhere between that of the U.S. and Europe,
providing little practical guidance for businesses, lawyers or software
developers in the industry. This paper seeks to establish an approach,
solution and justification for the correction of these problems.
Discussion in the area of software patents is often based substantially
around patent law theory and statistical analysis. Such approaches disregard
the context in which these laws operate. As a direct consequence the
connection between software patents and innovation remains an area of
substantial conjecture. As the basis for policy decisions this non-contextual
approach leaves much to be desired. In Canada this situation is amplified by
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the fact that few significant efforts have been made to study the legal effects
of patents on the Canadian software sector.
Recognizing the gap between theory and practice this paper seeks to
marry the academic debate over software patentability with concrete
Canadian perspectives from inside the industry. To this end primary
research based on personal interviews with representatives from three
software companies, with innovation offices in Canada, is used to shed a
contextual, Canadian and practical light on U.S. and EU patent law theory.
The trend which emerged from these interviews was that Canadian software
companies generally find software patents detrimental to their business
objectives. Given the small sample size, confirmation of this trend within
the broader Canadian software industry is not possible and further research is
required in order to substantiate this papers recommendations. However,
assuming that the software companies interviewed are representative of the
Canadian software industry then the detrimental trend identified aligns the
Canadian software industry with non-innovation theories of software
patentability. This allows the paper to justifiably conclude that Canada
should not extend patentability to software or in the alternative that a
carefully considered extension of patent law which responds systemically to
the unique needs of the software industry and other emerging technologies
may be appropriate. Most importantly the paper stresses the practical
importance of active contextual research during the development of clear
and strong guidelines related to the patentability of software in Canada
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INTRODUCTION
Over time patent law has continually increased its range of
influence and with each expansion debate over its merits and value
has never been far behind.1 In the software development sector there
has been ongoing international debate regarding patentability for at
least 15 years.2 In most cases debate on such topics normally gives
way to general acceptance as the value of patents becomes recognized
in the newly enveloped sector.3 This has arguably not occurred in the
software industry. Despite being bound by international laws, which
deal directly with the patentability of software, individual countries
continue to justify vastly different legislative and practical approaches

Edith Tilton Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System, (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1951). Penrose shows that industry in the 17 th and 18th century
vehemently opposed the patenting of mechanical devices.
2 Cases in the U.S. including Re: Alappat, 33 F.3d 1562 (1994) and State Street Bank v.
Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (1998) triggered significant debate as the
U.S. committed to its approach on software patentability.
3 Supra note 1. As an example the vehicle industry, initially opposed to patenting,
became one of its principle advocates in a period of less than 10 years.
1

99

to the problem.4 In a very traditional and conservative fashion
Canada has placed itself carefully on the fence in this debate adopting
an approach which falls somewhere between that of the U.S. and
Europe. The result is best described as a non-position on software
patentability providing little practical guidance for businesses, lawyers
or innovators in the industry.
Discourse in the sphere of software patents is predominantly
focused on the approaches of the U.S. and EU due in large part to both
their size and economic influence as well as the divergence of their
solutions. Furthermore, discussion is often based substantially around
patent law theory and statistical analysis. Such an approach disregards
the context in which these laws operate.5 As a direct consequence the
connection between software patents and innovation remains an area
of substantial conjecture. As the basis for policy decisions this noncontextual approach leaves much to be desired. In Canada this
situation is amplified as few significant efforts have been made to
study the legal effects of patents on our software sector.6
Recognizing the gap between theory and practice this paper
seeks to marry the academic debate over software patentability with
concrete Canadian perspectives from inside the industry. It is the
author’s hope that this investigation will create a more stable practical
foundation for legislative and policy based decision making in the
future.7 To this end the paper proceeds in five parts. In part one
Canada’s basic handling of software patents is examined - revealing a
very undecided approach with far ranging practical consequences for
numerous parties. This weak position, along with a dearth of
Canadian based discourse in this area, leads the paper, in part two, to a
comparative learning exercise involving the examination of U.S. and
EU approaches to patent law. This establishes two paradoxically
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) , WTO, 15 April 1994,
Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization at
27(1).
5 James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, “An Empirical Look at Software Patents” (2007) 16
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 157 at 171.
6 Due to its size, relative to the US, the sector has been dismissed as irrelevant in the
academic, practical and legislative spheres. Interview of Legal Staff at Faskin
Martineau (March 15, 2008).
7 For example, the currently proposed revisions to MOPOP Chapter 13 – Computer
Implemented Inventions. See http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernetinternetopic.nsf/eng/wr00758.html.
4
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divergent approaches operating under the international Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) treaty.8 Having established
no clear policy direction via this comparison the paper turns, in part
three, to an examination of the academic and theoretical discourse in
this area. Strong arguments on either side of the patent innovation
debate are examined but no clear answer emerges providing the paper
with the impetus for a contextual investigation. Part four responds by
examining the question of innovation from the perspective of three
software companies with research and development offices in Canada.
The trend which emerges is that Canadian software companies
generally find software patents detrimental to their business
objectives. Given the small sample size, confirmation of this trend
within the broader Canadian software industry is not possible and
further research is required in order to substantiate this papers
recommendations. However, assuming that the perspectives of the
software companies considered are representative of the Canadian
software industry then the detrimental trend identified aligns the
Canadian software industry with the non-innovation theories of
software patentability explored in part three. By aligning this research
with the legal and theoretical explorations undertaken previously the
paper provides itself with the justification required for part five in
which two potential policy responses are advocated, mainly: the
exclusion of software from patentability or a carefully considered
extension of patent law which responds systemically to the unique
needs of the software industry. Most importantly, this paper
establishes that before adopting a positive software patent regime the
patent office, judiciary and legislature must present a clear and unified
opinion based on the active contextual research of Canada’s software
industry and its relationship with patent law. The paper therefore
establishes an approach, solution and justification for the correction of
Canada’s software patentability debate.
1.0 CANADA’S SOFTWARE PATENT PROBLEM
This section first introduces the core principles of patent law
and how these core tenets affect software patentability. It then
examines Canada’s approach to software patents and the impact this
has on the principle stakeholders in the software and legal industries.
8

Supra note 4.
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1.1 Patents Generally
In Canada the Patent Act provides the legal mechanisms
through which patents are reviewed, granted and protected.9 Patent
law is viewed as a bargain between inventors and the state – in
exchange for the inventor’s full disclosure of the invention, the
inventor is given an exclusive right to prevent others from making,
selling, or using the invention for a fixed term. This bargain is viewed
as a way to “…stimulate the creation and development of new
technologies”.10 As such the notion of innovation tends to be the
principle justification for patent regimes and is at the root of the
software patentability debate.
Patent law was developed in Florence Italy and the pioneering
Italian statute of 1478 introduced a set of core principles which form
the basis of modern patent law today.11 In Canada the Italian ideology
is broken into four components: statutory subject matter, novelty,
inventiveness and usefulness. To be patentable an idea and its
implementation must meet all of the tests which flow from these
tenets. The statutory subject requirement means that an invention
must fall within the range of subjects which a state defines as
patentable. Under Canadian patent we exclude from patentability all
abstract theorems or mere scientific principles.12 Novelty means that
an invention must be original and not previously disclosed to the
public. This requirement gives rise to the notion of prior art, that is
disclosures to the public, to which patent examiners and inventors
must be particularly wary.13 Inventiveness is defined in Canada as
that which would not have been obvious to a person skilled in the
art.14 Finally utility continues to be a vague concept in Canadian
patent law as it is not defined by our statute. Courts have sometimes
interpreted this to mean that a patent must have economic

Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c P-4.
David Vaver, Essentials of Canadian Law: Intellectual Property Law: Copyright,
Patents, Trademarks (Concorde Ontario: Irwin Law Concorde Ontario, 1997) at 113.
11 Ikechi Mgbeoji, Global Biopiracy: Patents, Plants and Indigenous Knowledge ,
9

10

(Vanvouver: UBC Press, 2006) at 16.
12 Supra note 9 at s.27(8).
13 Supra note 9 at s.28.2.
14 Supra note 9 at s.28.3.
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consequences, though others have taken a more liberal approach
relying on the patent application itself to define its own utility.

1.2 Software Patents
In Canada software patents are not a specific form of patent,
but rather the term simply identifies patents which use, or are related
to, computer software. As such, software patents must still meet the
traditional tests for statutory subject matter, novelty, inventiveness
and utility. These core elements present some unique challenges in
this field of innovation.
From a purely statutory perspective abstract theories,
including mathematical ones, are excluded from patentability under
Canadian law.
However, there is no distinction, other than
representation, between computer code, and mathematics. Software
and computer code are simply human readable implementations of
lambda calculus – a form of pure mathematics. The famous ChurchTuring thesis established in 1936 that any computer function is simply
the equivalent of a mathematical expression.15
Thus, although
computer programs are not explicitly excluded by Canadian patent
law, there is a convincing argument that they fall dangerously close to
the abstract theory exception. It helps to imagine, as developed by
Ben Klemens, a spectrum of inventions. At one end we can place
patentable physical machines made of transistors and diodes; at the
other end we can place pure un-patentable math. Policy should select
a clear dividing line between the patentable and the un-patentable at
some point in this spectrum.16 Problematically, separating machine
from math rapidly becomes a grayscale exercise as they are often
intimately related to one another.17
Novelty also presents an interesting problem. In most cases
novelty is interpreted by Canadian patent examiners as requiring a
thorough search of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO)

Douglas R. Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Back: An Eternal Golden Braid, (New York:
Basic Books, 1979) at 428.
16 Ben Klemens, Math You Can’t Use (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 2006) at
44.
17 Grayscale is reference to both the 256 shades of gray traditionally recognized by
computers, though almost indistinguishable by humans, as well as the shades of grey
dividing machine from math in the sphere of software.
15
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databases. The USPTO is recognized as the world’s single largest
prior-art resource and though prior-art searches should proceed
further the cost and expediency requirements of patent examinations
usually make this impossible.18 Problematically software development
and innovation has been occurring for much longer than we have had
software patents. As a result prior-art in this field exists in a
multitude of places.19
The vagueness of utility in Canadian patent law also creates
difficulties as the product of a software program is not normally
tangible. Unlike industrial patents where the monopoly is against a
manufacturing process a software patent is held against a method or
mathematical implementation of a concept. These ideas can be
realized by anyone with access to a home computer. This raises the
question of whether patents, which were intended to promote
industrial innovation through economic incentives, have any role in
constraining the actions of individuals.20
The requirement of inventiveness has a close link with that of
novelty. The test for obviousness is a highly subjective one based
around the “skilled person in the art”.21 As a relatively new field of
technology computers are often bewildering to the average user – but
to a skilled person in the art most software development is the obvious
implementation of logical decision making processes. Worse still is
the fact that most software development is simply the modification of
existing prior art - an infinite regression of ideas built upon other
ideas with no discernable starting point.22 In computer science this is
called code re-use and it is part of the developer’s creed. Patenting
software therefore means one patents a multitude of previous works
with implications both up and down the innovation chain.

18

Supra note 16 at 74.

Grant C. Yang, “The Continuing Debate of Software Patents and the Open Source
Movement” (2004) 13 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 171 at 186.
20 Russell McOrmond, “A Review of Software Patent Issues, Digital Copyright
Canada” online:<http://www.flora.ca/patent2003/software-patent2003.shtml>.
21 Beloit v. Valmet Oy, [1986] 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289.
22 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time, (New York: Bantam Book, 1988).
19
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1.3 Canada’s Basic Non-Position
The foregoing establishes that there are some conceptual
problems with simply applying existing patent law definitions to
computer software. Canada is not alone in attempting to recognize
these theoretical difficulties. The result, however, is a disjunction
between the legislative, practical and judicial treatment of patent laws
as they apply to computer software. 23
From 1978 to 2005 the Canadian patent office adopted the
official position that patents for computer programs were not
appropriate based on fears that they would hinder progress in an
emerging field.24 In 2005 the Manual of Patent Office Practice
(MoPOP) was amended substantially, effectively reversing this
position in a two phase re-interpretation of the Patent Act’s statutory
subject matter exception.25 First, section 12.04.05 of MoPOP was
added – holding that computer programs would be considered
statutory subject matter so long as they were “… integrated with
traditionally patentable subject matter”.
In addition to this
categorization of software MoPOP introduced chapter 16 - an entirely
new chapter on computer implemented inventions. In the context of
software innovations only chapter 16 further clarifies the statutory
definitions used in chapter 12 emphasizing that traditionally
patentable subject matter may include not only physical
implementations and results but any “…essentially economic result
relating to trade, industry or commerce”.26 Then finally in a caveat it
notes that this “economic result” requirement is not met simply by
performing calculations producing useful information – thereby
arguably excluding most traditional software programs.
Further changes to chapter 12 of MoPOP were introduced in
2009 and changes to chapter 16 of MoPOP are currently pending. As
of this writing Chapters 12 and 16 of MoPOP do not accord with one
another. However, the emerging subject matter requirement for
computer programs appears to be that “the device must provide a
The EU has been left in a vastly similar position as explored in part 2.3.
Supra note 10 at 129.
25 “Canadian Intellectual Property Office - Manual of Patent Office Practice”, March
2007 at c.12 and c.16. MoPOP is a non-binding practical guide for practitioners and
patent examiners which helps to explore the interpretation of the Canadian Patent
Act.
26 Ibid. at c. 16.03.02.
23
24
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novel and inventive technological solution to a technological
problem”.27
Even for professionals the resulting legal terrain is far from
clear.
Lawyers with Bereskin and Parr, a leading Canadian
intellectual property firm, opined recently that the MoPOP’s
clarifications mean little without additional jurisprudence.28 Rather
than sending a clear signal regarding patentability the patent office
has established that software may be patentable if it meets certain
criteria, is claimed appropriately, and produces an economic result.
No further guidance is provided to anyone. Compounding this
problem is the fact that the only case related to software patentability
in Canada is from 1981 and it effectively held that computer programs
are not patentable.29
Consequently, the disjunction between
legislative, practical and judicial treatment becomes clear. Statute and
case law suggest that software is not patentable while the practical
guidelines suggest that it may be patentable under carefully
constructed circumstances. In such a climate it is difficult to trust that
an issued patent would be of any concrete legal value. The result is
what might best be termed a non-position. There is no unified
agreement with respect to software patents between any of the
governmental bodies responsible for upholding our patent laws. Far
from clarifying the state of software patents in Canada the MoPOP
guidelines simply created a great deal of breathing room for argument.
What becomes evident is that legislative and judicial clarification of
Canada’s official position on these matters is required specifically in
light of the fact that MoPOP is merely a set of interpretive guidelines.

1.4 The problem for parties
Given the complexity of understanding Canada’s position on
software patents it should come as no surprise that this has substantial
practical impacts on numerous stakeholders in the software industry.
At least five interrelated groups and their interests are impacted by

Canadian Intellectual Property Office - Manual of Patent Office Practice”, February
2010 at c.12.06.06b.
28 Sam Frost and Ebad Rahman, “How to Protect Software Inventions”, (2007)
Managing IP 53 at 53 online:<www.managingip.com>.
29 Schlumberger Canada Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents , [1981] 56 C.P.R. (2d) 204
(FCA).
27
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the ambiguous results examined above. First and foremost perhaps
are lawyers who without further guidance are unsure of what is and is
not patentable. As a direct result they are unable to advise their
clients in any meaningful and practical manner.
Without clear direction from its legal representation the
software industry in Canada doesn’t know how it should proceed.
Filing a patent is an expensive process and without clear guidelines
firms are unlikely to pursue this avenue of IP protection. Worse still,
due to Canada’s previously long standing exemption of software from
patentability companies may still labour under the belief that this is
the law. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that
companies and their legal representatives may not discuss the
implications of software patentability in other countries, such as the
U.S. and EU, due to the influence of domestic confusion on the subject
area as a whole.
This has a trickledown effect on software developers and
lower level employees within the software industry. As this paper
examines later companies do not appear to educate their staff
regarding even basic intellectual property matters. Knowing that
software is often the compilation and modification of existing code
this results in a problematic environment within which developers
are unaware of even basic legal issues regarding the licensing and
patent protection of publicly available works.
Finally, given that MoPOP is the only source of true guidance
in this area it is difficult to suggest that patent examiners have a clear
understanding of what is and is not patentable in the software
industry.

1.5 Summary
This section has established that there are issues with simply
applying traditional patent law definitions to computer programs. In
exploring the impact of these issues through Canada’s existing statutes
and guidelines it was shown that Canada has an uncertain and
untested position regarding software patentability. The lack of
agreement between legislative, judicial and practical approaches to
software patenting has a substantial impact on numerous industry
stakeholders and legal professionals. A substantial burden therefore
appears to fall on the legislative and judicial bodies of Canada to
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clarify the situation by responding to MoPOP’s guidelines. In making
these policy decisions it would appear worthwhile to investigate the
responses and success of other countries with respect to software
patentability. The paper therefore turns now to just such a
comparative exercise.

2.0 LEARNING THROUGH COMPARISON
This section looks to the laws and experiences of other
countries with the objective of evaluating and learning from their
experiences. It begins with an examination of how TRIPS engages the
issue of software patentability, thereby binding its signatories. It then
examines the paradoxically divergent approaches of the U.S. and EU.

2.1 Requirements of TRIPS
The objective of the TRIPS agreement, signed in 1995, was to
harmonize the patent systems of World Trade Organization (WTO)
members in order to facilitate the protection, trade and secure
exchange of intellectual property.30 The agreement therefore binds
Canada, the U.S. and EU nations as all are members of the WTO.
With respect to computer programs article 27 (Patentable Subject
Matter) of the agreement is most often cited as requiring that TRIPS
signatories must extend their patent regimes to protect software. This
section states that “patents shall be available for any inventions… in
all fields of technology provided that they are… capable of industrial
application”.31 TRIPS also states, in article 10 that “computer
programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as
literary works (copyright) under the Berne convention”.32
These two sections create an interesting internal contradiction
with respect to software. It has been argued that under TRIPS a given
intellectual achievement should only attract one form of protection.
Since TRIPS explicitly provides that computer programs are protected
under copyright they shouldn’t be protected by patent law under
Daniel Gervais, The Trips Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1998) at 11.
31 Supra note 4 at a.27.
32 Supra note 4 at a.10.
30
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article 27.33 The converse of this argument is that TRIPS simply
provides a minimum level of protection under article 10 – permitting
individual nations to decide what subject matter should be patentable
under article 27. On this view computer programs are more than
simply lines of code but have functional aspects.34 TRIPS in and of
itself therefore does not appear to definitively answer the question of
software patentability.

2.2 Development of U.S. Patent Law
The U.S. approach to software patentability has been one of
slow historical growth principally through judicial decision making.
The case of Diamond v. Diehr is normally identified as the case which
tilted the U.S. towards its pro-software patent stance. In that case the
Supreme Court held that “… an invention is not necessarily unpatentable simply because it utilizes software”.35 More recently State
Street Bank is viewed as entrenching and firmly establishing the U.S.’s
acceptance of both software and business method patentability.36
Like Canada the U.S. retains an exception for patentability in
relation to pure mathematical algorithms but American courts
interpret this exception very narrowly allowing software to be
patented so long as it has any useful application. U.S. and Canadian
statutory law are therefore almost indistinguishable. In addition,
there is a striking similarity between MoPOP and the U.S. patent
examiners guidelines, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP), on the subject of software. The substantial difference
between Canada and the U.S. is that judicially the U.S. has seen far
more treatment of patent cases at the Federal level. The country has
thus been able to establish a clear and well publicized stance on the
matter allowing practical application of the legislation.
The situation for the U.S. is, however, not devoid of problems.
A rapid increase in software patent volume has resulted in an

FFII Workgroup 2004, “The TRIPS Treaty and Software Patents”
online:<http://eupat.ffii.org/analysis/trips/index.en.html>.
34 Miguel E. Sciancalepore, “Protecting New Technologies in Latin America: The Case
for Computer Software Patents in Argentia”, (2006) 38 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev.
349 at 375.
35 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) at 177.
36 State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (1998)
33
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overtaxing of the USPTO. The quality level of approved software
patents is generally recognized as extremely low with a substantial
number of patents being recognized as overbroad within the
industry.37 Because patents are presumed valid it is extraordinarily
difficult and expensive to overturn them. As a result a variety of
techniques have sprung up in the U.S. market to profit from this state
of affairs - patent trolls being the preeminent example. Trolls game
the system by first obtaining overly broad software patents then using
those patents offensively to induce licensing fee agreements from
companies theoretically infringing the patent. Companies submit to
such extortion as the license fees requested are often less than the cost
of fighting the patent. The USPTO has moved to rectify these
problems as of late by attempting to hire computer science graduates
so as to improve its prior-art searches and obviousness examination
procedures.38

2.3 Development of EU Patent Law
In the European Union (EU) patent law is governed by the
European Patent Convention (EPC) which was developed by the
European Parliament (EP) – a legislative branch of the EU. Patent
examination is performed by the European Patent Office (EPO). The
objective of the EPC was to harmonize the securing of patent
protection across national boundaries in Europe.39 A patent granted
by the EPO is therefore presumptively valid in every EU country.
Nonetheless, individual countries are not bound by EPO decisions and
are free to invalidate nationally challenged patents.40
Article 52(2) of the EPC specifically excludes from
patentability not only scientific and mathematical theories but
programs for computers. However, excluded subject matter under
37

Supra note 16 at 73.

“Intellectual Property: USPTO Has Made Progress in Hiring Examiners, but
Challenges to Retention Remain” General Accounting Office Reports & Testimony
Newsletter (1 August 2005).
39 Supra note 19 at 180.
40 John Moetteli, “The Patentability of Software in the U.S. and Europe”, (Presentation
for the Institut fur Europaishes and Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht St. Gallen
Switzerland 28 October 2005) at 7 online<
http://www.patentinfo.net/patentsearchersnet/download/THE_PATENTABILITY_OF
_SOFTWARE_IN_THE_US_AND_EUROPE.pdf>.
38
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52(2) is subject to article 52(3) which states that exclusions only
operate where the “…patent relates to [excluded] subject-matter as
such”.41 Interpretation of the words “as such” has caused deep
divisions between the EPC, EPO and EP for over a decade.
Through its examination guidelines the EPO has voiced its
opinion that the words “as such” are to be narrowly construed. The
EPO thus holds that “…while computer programs are excluded by the
EPC, software is not excluded subject matter if it…. brings about a
technical effect”. The EPC then goes on to define technical effect as
anything “achieved by the internal functioning of a computer… under
the influence of a… program”.42 The effect is that so long as one
claims the “use” of a computer program rather than the programs
“method” the EPO will grant a patent for the software.43
In 2005 the EPO moved to formalize this position through a
bill before European Parliament. The EP responded by throwing out
the bill and re-iterating that software programs were not to be viewed
as patentable subject matter.44 Since then the EPO has continued to
approve software patents, but individual nations within the EU,
namely Germany and the UK, have invalidated the patents challenged
within their borders.45 Practically speaking this means that software
is patentable in the EU but that such patents will not be upheld before
national courts in the largest EU markets. Echoes of the confusing
Canadian situation are unmistakable, however, there appears to be a
greater consensus between parliament and judiciary within the EU as
compared to Canada suggesting that the EPO is simply acting as a
renegade inside a system which generally opposes software
patentability.

Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC) , European Parliament, 5
October 1973 at 52.
42 “The TRIPs Treaty and Software Patents”, (Paper for FFII Workgroup, 2004)
online:<http://www.eupat.ffii.org/analysis/trips/index.en.html>.
43 Canadian patent attorneys will be familiar with this logic as an adaptation of the
method versus use claim approach to medicines.
44 R. Hilty & C. Geiger, “Patenting Software? A Judicial and Socio-Economic Analysis”
(2005) 36 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 615 at
617.
45 For an example of invalidation in Germany see
http://ipgeek.blogspot.com/2007/11/german-federal-patent-court-invalidates.html.
41
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2.4 Reconciling the Difference
The solutions of the U.S. and EU are generally divergent with
the U.S. taking a pro-software patentability approach and the EU, at
least at the legislative and judicial levels, calling for non-patentability.
These variations in approach become almost contradictory in light of
the fact that the U.S. and the EU are both signatories to TRIPS. The
malleability of the TRIPS language effectively leaves nation states to
their own devices in adopting or discarding software patentability.
Therefore TRIPS, in and of itself, is of little assistance in helping us to
clarify the Canadian state of affairs. What we can conclude from the
U.S. and EU evidence is that the involvement of the judiciary and
legislative branches is critical in establishing, publicizing and
solidifying a strong position regarding software patentability –
regardless of which position is assumed. This evidence, however, falls
well short of helping us to establish a justifiable policy position. In
response the paper now turns to an examination of the academic
discourse in this area in order to determine if legal theory can provide
us with any clearer answers.
3.0 INNOVATION OR SUBSTITUTION
In this section a brief overview of academic discourse in the
area of software patentability is undertaken. Much of the literature
reviewed originates in the U.S. as it is the principle world market
which has adopted computer patents. This provides Canada with an
excellent test bed from which we can learn about the impacts of such
an economic experiment.46

3.1 Software Patents and Innovation
The correlation between innovation and patentability is at the
center of the software patent dispute and a great number of academic
papers deal with this subject. A summary of the literature in this area
is perhaps best established by Robert Merges who states that despite
initial concerns software “… patents have not killed software…. [but]
this is hardly a ringing endorsement for the new regime.”47
46

Supra note 5 at 158. Bessen and Hunt describe the U.S. model as an experiment.

Robert Merges, “Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings”,
(2006) 85 Tex. L. Re. 1628 at 1633.
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Unpacking the history of this statement serves as a good exploration
of the innovation question.
It was initially believed in the early 90’s that the introduction
of software patents would shut down innovation in the software
industry or concentrate power in the hands of only a few companies.48
Empirical evidence over the last 15 years suggests this simply hasn’t
happened – innovation and new market entrants continue to
abound.49 Innovation incentives are regularly cited by the U.S.
judicial system as the motivating factor behind the extension of
patents to software.50 Though the innovation-patentability question is
superficially simply, and attractive as a justification, drawing a
conclusive link between the two has been a very elusive task. Bessen
and Hunt, for example, manage to positively correlate R&D
expenditures with the number of patents a firm owns.51
Unfortunately, they note that there are numerous other factors
besides the incentive to innovate that may create this statistical
association.52 Bessen and Hunt’s research is also criticized for its
reliance on outdated information as well as its use of data from
irrelevant industry sectors such as manufacturing.53 As a result even
their limited findings have questionable application in a pure software
market.
In a less cautious paper Grant Yang concludes that software
patent incentives motivate both small and large companies to
innovate.54 However, his paper is based on second hand observations
and pure theory rather than substantive research. His conclusions are
also directly disputed by ongoing statistical research conducted by
Ronald Mann et al. which finds that patents are of limited or even
negative value to start-up companies.55
“The League for Programming Freedom - Against Software Patents”, Letter to
USPTO, USPTO (24, October, 1990).
49 Supra note 47 at 1634.
50 Supra note 16 at 44.
51 Supra note 5 at 173.
52 Ibid. at 184.
53 Robert Hahn and Scott Wallsten, “A Review of Bessen and Hunt’s Analysis of
Software Patents”, (2003)
online:<http://www.researchineurope.org/policy/hahn_wallsten.pdf > at 2.
54 Supra note 19 at 195.
55 Ronald Mann & Thomas W. Sager, “Patents, Venture Capital and Software StartUps” (2006) 36 Research Policy 193.
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Historically the link between innovation and patentability has
been seriously questioned and the same appears no less true in the
current debate.56 As the basis for judicial treatment, and thus the US’s
approach to patent law, the innovation argument is therefore suspect.
Given the diversity of economic factors at play one of the only ways
to confirm this causal connection is to undertake a contextual review
and directly survey the opinions of industry representatives.57 Ronald
Mann undertook just such a review in the U.S. and concluded that “…
absent some other benefit all [software] firms would be better off
saving the costs of obtaining patents”. Once again this isn’t a glowing
review of the regime adopted by our neighbors. It does however lead
to the question of whether patents serve some other function, besides
as an innovation incentive, and whether the value of such a function
makes software patentability worthwhile.

3.2 Software Patents as Something Else
The entrenchment of software patentability in the U.S., as
well as the lack of conclusiveness regarding the innovationpatentability question, has driven Mann, Merges and others in recent
research to accept rather than fight the regime. Instead of looking for
justifications they now look to improve and explain the alternative
value(s) created by its existence. Most notably they have examined
the value of patents in the venture capital process. Venture capital is
a particularly important element in bringing many software projects
to market because innovation often occurs within small cash strapped
companies who cannot afford the cycles of production and marketing
which follow innovation.58
In the venture capital sphere Mann has convincing and
repeatedly established that venture capitalists consider patents to be
one of a number of factors used to establish the investment value of a

“Debunking Software Patent Myths”, (1992) Communications of the ACM online<
http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/6805/articles/int-prop/heckeldebunking.html#NinePats>.
57 P. S. Petraitis, A. E. Dunham & P. H. Niewiarowski, “Inferring Multiple Causality:
The Limitations of Path Analysis” (1996) 10 Functional Ecology 421. Mathematics
and statistics are naturally limited in this manner, though there are techniques for
modeling multiple causality issues.
58 Supra note 19 at 196.
56
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firm.59 In Canada anecdotal evidence suggests that the same is true, at
least within the wider IP and venture capital fields, but that value
differs substantially on a case-by-case basis.60 Thus, although venture
capital has largely shaped the U.S. software industry its relationship to
patents, like the innovation question, is dependant on a wide range of
factors.61 This makes it difficult to establish any clear positive effects.
The consequences of the U.S. patentability model have
nonetheless been felt by the software industry. Hunt notes that in the
U.S. innovators who cannot afford to bring their products to market
themselves will often resort to “… increasing their patenting in order
to tax the rents earned on rival’s inventions and to mitigate similar
behavior in their rivals”. These two approaches are more generally
known as the offensive and defensive use of patent portfolios.62
Offensive use refers to the sword like use of a patent by a company to
challenge a competitor via claims of infringement. Similar to patent
trolling offensive use requires firms to seek out targets and threaten
legal action. Defensive use refers to the functioning of patents as a
protective shield used to hopefully mitigate the effects of offensive
claims. The entirety of this process, as noted in our discussion of
patent trolls, is exacerbated by the issuance of overly broad patents.
The end result is what has been termed the patent thicket. A jumble
of overly broad and likely invalid patents held up by software
companies to shield themselves from the market effects enabled and
permitted by the regime.63 Whether this result should be viewed as a
benefit of the patent system is highly questionable.
First-to-market advantages are a further component of the
larger economic impact created by software patents. The concept of
first-to-market, also known as network effect, refers to the tendency
in software for the first innovator with a publicly released product to
become the market leader. Network effects in the software industry

Ronald Mann, “Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?” (2004) 83
Tex. L. Rev. 961 at 966. AND J. Allison and A. Dunn and R. Mann, “Software Patents,
Incumbents and Entry”, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1580 (2007)
60 Marc Castel “IP Barrier or Enabler to Innovation” (Presentation to Challenges in IP
Class, 24 March 2008) [unpublished].
61 Supra note 47 at 1642.
62 Robert Hunt, “When Do Patents Reduce R&D?” (2006) 96 American Economic
Review 87 at 87.
63 Supra note 16 at 83.
59

115

are intensified by at least two forces. First, product development
lifecycles are extremely short.64 Working products can be released
within months. Second, and in opposition, the issuance of patents is
regularly an 18 month procedure – plenty of time for a competing
company to develop and release a product thereby gaining an
important market lead.65 As a result, diverting time and effort during
R&D to patent ideas increases costs and reduces the ability to
capitalize on the value of a first-to-market release. Consequently, the
unique features of the software industry and market suggest that
patents have a dubious value in this regard as well.

3.3 The Failure to Reconcile and Contextualize
The forgoing has established that software patents don’t
appear to have a clear connection with innovation. So far as research
can say there is at best a positive correlation between R&D and
patenting activities. The motivation behind such activities could be
the result of numerous factors. If patents are not serving as an
incentive to innovate then a justification for their existence needs to
be based on some other set of benefits. Research into alternative
benefits in the U.S. shows that they appear to have some value as
alternative measures of a companies value and are thus sometimes
beneficial in venture capital or Merger and Acquisition (M&A)
situations. Patents also enable companies to engage competitors
through alternative business models based on offensive and defensive
tactics. Taken as a whole, even if these benefits were substantial,
which they don’t appear to be, they would need to be corroborated in
the Canadian context. Keeping in mind these arguments the paper is
thus lead, as was Mann, to consider contextual research as the solution
to the inconclusive evidence presented thus far.
4.0 EXAMINING THE CANADIAN CONTEXT
Legal theory, statistical research and international approaches
have provided us with no clear justification for a policy based decision
regarding software patentability. The objective of this section is to
move beyond these theories and debates using practical and
64
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Supra note 16 at 87.
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contextual Canadian evidence. The hope is that this will allow us to
more clearly define the elusive innovation-patent relationship. In
what follows profiles for three software development firms with
innovation offices in Toronto are utilized as the basis for a
contextualized profile of the Canadian software development industry
and its relationship with patent law.66

4.1 Three Case Studies
Appendix A more closely examines the detailed responses of
three Canadian software development firms to numerous questions
about innovation and patentability. The objective of this section is
simply to summarize the basis, limitations and conclusions which
emerged from this research.
The company profiles available in Appendix A are based on
personal interviews conducted and initiated by the author through
industry contacts. Great efforts were made to minimize bias and
obtain data which is representative of a range of sub-industries
(software systems, software tools, web technologies) from companies
in a variety of developmental stages (privately funded, seeking
investment, publicly traded) and of various institutional sizes (from 40
to over 3000). Due to the limited sample size is difficult to say that
the three companies form a representative sample. However, given
the substantial agreement between them regarding the value of
software patents it is argued that they serve as a valid starting point
for understanding the Canadian context.
The responses of firms exhibited the natural tendency to break
down along five principle lines of discussion within which the impact
of patents can be examined, mainly: innovation, use, value, cost and
education. With respect to innovation all three companies were asked
whether they would continue to do business if software patents were
unavailable. They all responded that their businesses would continue
to operate substantially as they do today regardless of the status of
software patentability.
On the topic of patent use only the U.S. based and largest
company profiled admitted to the acquisition and defensive, but not
For privacy, business and legal reasons the identities of these businesses are not
revealed.
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offensive, use of patents in order to establish bargaining chips for the
purposes of cross licensing.67 The other firms did not feel that
software patents would serve any valid use in the software industry
due to the impact of first-to-market factors.68
Patent value and cost were highly interrelated in the minds of
the firms interviewed. The general consensus was that patents could
provide valuable defensive protection in cross licensing agreements or
infringement cases but that such value was generally outweighed by
the cost of obtaining and maintaining a patent portfolio. Alternatives
such as circumventing patent claims or halting product development
were viewed as more viable responses to infringement claims.
Across the board the education of individuals regarding IP
issues was found to be very low. Again only the largest and U.S. based
company had any formal IP instruction program in place. At the
opposite end of the short spectrum Company 1 was lacking even the
vestiges of such a policy.69
In summary, the consensus among companies was best put by
the IP director of one firm who stated that “… software patents are
primarily a cost, a burden and a distraction to our business… [they]
are an infrequent after-thought; our business focus is getting solid
solutions to market first”.

4.2 Alignment with Non-Innovation
The research suggests that all three companies would
remain in business regardless of the status of software patents in
Canada, or indeed the US. To this extent their responses appear to
echo the work and opinions of Mann who “… doubt[s] that legal rules
granting protection have a sufficiently substantial effect to alter the
course of innovation in either direction”.70 The Canadian responses
are also in line with Hunt’s empirical research which concluded that
“… growth in software patents may not be associated with an
improvement in the incentives to innovate particularly in the [pure
software] industries.”71 At best this describes a situation in which
See Company Profile 3 in Appendix A.
Supra note 19.
69 See Company Profile 1 in Appendix A.
70 Supra note 59 at 966.
71 Supra note 5 at 184.
67
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patents don’t contribute to innovation in any substantial fashion. This
raises the question of whether, through their establishment,
additional positive or negative factors are introduced to the market by
software patent regimes.
Our exploration of the U.S. model as well as patent laws core
tenets established that software patents are plagued with problems in
practical application. They have given rise to entirely new business
models in the U.S. which at best have nothing to do with innovation
and at worse impede innovation by exploiting the resources of
companies that would otherwise invest further in R&D. The claim by
Company 1, that it would consider ceasing operations in the face of
any substantial lawsuit, supports the view that patents may negatively
impact innovation under certain circumstances. In addition the
USPTO has publicly recognized that its weak examination procedures
have resulted in overbroad patents being issued. The result for
companies caught in infringement claims is financially significant
whether they settle or dispute the claims. Armed with this
knowledge it becomes clear that if Canada does embrace software
patentability it should be prepared for the additional burdens which
will be placed on its patent examination officers and market
players/innovators.
Given the low innovation value ascribed to software patents
by the companies interviewed the conclusion that the Canadian
context supports non-patentability is well justified. This is specifically
true in light of the potential downside risks, such as trolling, exhibited
in the U.S. and echoed as concerns domestically.

4.3 Patents as an Alternative Vehicle
Research in the U.S. did show that patents could hold value
for companies seeking investment capital.72 In such situations patents
can be used as an alternative vehicle and measure of future market
success. Though this does appear to occur in the U.S. the same was
not found to be true in Canada.73
One company in the research panel was actively seeking
investment capital and it did not see any substantial correlation
72
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between investment potential and its patent portfolio.74 This is again
in keeping with Mann’s research and the impact of first-to-market
effects – the view was that more profit could be obtained by adhering
to a rapid innovation and release schedule and such a model did not
mesh with the lengthy patenting process.
The companies also dismissed or disliked the use of patents as
defensive and offensive tools generally regarding it as a burden that
caused them to stray from core business objectives. As such the
principle alternative benefits potentially derived from a patent regime
do not appear to have substantial application in Canada at this time.
Thus, as a policy position, the non-patentability of software again
appears to be a justified response.

4.4 The Education and Low Level Development Problem
A critical phase in the M&A and venture capital processes is
the inspection of IP holdings in order to establish potentially
patentable ideas as well as to identify latent violations.75 The latter
factor can be deeply impacted by the actions of low level developers
on a project. We have explored how the innovation lifecycle in
software is an extremely rapid and incremental process that builds
upon previous works. Our research also established that IP education
in the Canadian software industry is weak at best. These three factors
combine in a unique fashion creating the potential for patents to have
a profoundly negative impact on business processes.
It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which a low level
developer begins development of a new cutting edge feature by
searching for assistance on the internet. She’ll probably find help in
the form of publicly available though potentially licensed or patented
software.76 Using this as her starting point she may then invest
substantial time in the modification or extension of this code. The
end result may well be the incorporation of a licensed or even
patented piece of code into the core elements of her work. Most of
See Company Profile 2 in Appendix A.
This came out in discussions with IP officers and legal staff for several of the
companies profiled.
76 Many software projects are protected under the GNU public license or another
form of public licensing model. These models normally prevent the use of code for
commercial purposes.
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the companies interviewed didn’t concern themselves with such
issues at all.77 Others felt that the education of project managers was
sufficient.78 Managers, however, admitted that they normally based
their opinions on the time it takes a developer to complete a task. But
as the above example shows time is but one element of the
development process - problematic code can be incorporated into a
project inadvertently with little or substantial effort.
The education problem therefore poses an additional
downside risk for software companies in a patent based regime. This
risk is only theoretical and no direct evidence of problems was
exposed through the research. Nonetheless, it weights in favor of a
non-patentability policy or in the alternative suggests that a clearly
disseminated stance on software patentability is part of a fully
functional and sound regime.

4.5 Conclusions in the Canadian Context
In the Canadian context the above review of theory and
practice suggests that software patentability provides no significant
advantages to companies as either defensive, offensive or investment
tools. The core question of innovation, though always difficult to
answer conclusively, appears to be impacted little by the existence of
software patents. What has notably emerged through this practically
grounded exercise are the downside risks of patentability to the
software industry in Canada. Given that there are no clear
advantages, and that the EU generally operates successfully under a no
software patentability regime, the negative impact of patents appears
to tip the entirety of the ambiguous debate substantially towards a
finding of non-patentability. If the risk of implementing a software
patentability regime results in the highly arguable positive results that
have been explored but also brings with it, practically as well as
theoretically, harmful elements then the suggestion that Canada adopt
a non-patentability model with respect to software appears to be
logically defensible. The paper now turns to a formalization of this
recommendation.
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5.0 POLICY APPROACH AND CONCLUSIONS
This final section provides some policy and process
recommendations as substantiated by the theoretical, legal and
practical investigations undertaken above. The policy approach
advocated is comprised of three main elements: clear assertion, better
contextual research and non-patentability.
Should software
patentability be the only viable regime for reasons beyond the scope
of this paper suggestions are made regarding the implementation
details of such a system.

5.1 Canada Must Assert a Clear Position
The chief suggestion made by this paper is that Canada’s
policy regarding software patentability must be clarified. Though our
patent examination office has developed guidelines for software
patent practitioners and examiners they are untested and as such are
of limited real-world value. The result has been a substantial degree
of confusion in the software and legal industries regarding the
requirements and state of software patents in Canada. Based on the
U.S. and EU models it is clear that a unified vision and approach to
software patent law is required from the legislative, judicial and
examination branches of the government. The EU in particular
continues to face challenges and debate in light of the rogue actions of
its examination offices. Canada faces a similar situation unless there is
co-operation and agreement between all responsible parties.
Beyond simply determining a clear stance on patentability the
public assertion and dissemination of this position plays a critical role
in the continued development of Canada’s software industry.
Software patentability impacts low level developers and individuals due to the ability to create code using readily available tools. In
contrast industrial patents are traditionally harder and more expensive
to implement. As a direct result there is an increased risk of
infringement and litigation exposure within the public at large.
Education on these subjects is therefore just as important as the
decisions themselves.

5.2 Additional Contextual Research
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This paper has shown that the Canadian software industry
appears to respond in unique ways to the patentability dispute.
Unquestionably the research relied upon as the basis for these
conclusions is limited – the three firms interviewed may not be a
representative sample.
Nonetheless, the substantial agreement
between these corporations suggests that an underlying theme and
approach exists within Canada. What this paper suggests is therefore
valid on its face but requires further validation.
In 2002 the CIPO undertook a similar examination of its
MoPOP guidelines and in an effort to obtain contextual data issued a
call for papers.79 An access to information request made in 2005
showed that the only responses to this call were from big industry and
large corporate legal firms.80 The bias inherent in this sample is clear.
The conclusion is that in performing contextual research the
legislature, judiciary and CIPO should not be satisfied with evidence
from self selecting members of the industry. A properly conducted
and active research initiative is therefore advocated – a replication of
this papers approach would be considered an appropriate starting
point.
A proactive research endeavor is further supported by the
inconclusiveness of international laws, national responses and legal
theory in the software-patentability debate. This paper has shown
that resolving these problems may only be logically justifiable if we
look at the contextual response and impact to Canadian businesses in
order to resolve the overall uncertainties which have been explored.

5.3 Non-Patentability Approach
The argument for a non-patentable software regime in Canada
has been the focus of this paper. The reasoned and pragmatic
approach to this claim has proceeded in three identifiable phases.
First the legal responses of countries and theoretical discussions of
patent law were shown to be inconclusive. Second, a research based
investigation of the Canadian context was used to show that our
industry generally sees little value in software patents. Third,
See http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/patents/pt_notice-e.html.
In accordance with the Canadian Access to Information Act such requests can be
made by individuals for government documents. Details of the request and response
can be seen at http://www.flora.ca/A-2004-00246/.
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practical and theoretical negative factors were shown to be introduced
into the market by software patent regimes. It is argued that these
negative aspects, in light of the virtually balanced and persuasive
arguments which otherwise exist, are enough to support a logical
decision favoring the non-patentability of software in Canada. In
short, and in Canada, the negatives which are potentially introduced
outweigh the negligible positive impacts which were explored. Under
such an analysis there appears to be no logical justification for the
implementing a software patentability regime in Canada at this time.

5.4 Patentability Considerations
If adopting a non-patentability regime should provoke
substantial backlash in areas beyond the scope of this paper, such as in
international trade, the results of this research and analysis still serve
to establish some important points. First, the goal of asserting a clear
and unified position on software patentability remains critical to the
establishment of practically useful laws and guidelines. There is no
substantial difference between U.S. and Canadian laws what
differentiates them is the level of judicial involvement. Nationally a
high level of involvement has enabled the U.S. to establish a clear and
well publicized stance on the matter allowing predictable and
practical application of its legislation. This level of involvement is
required in Canada. Second the undertaking of further contextual
research retains value as it may provide further insight into the
unique factors which shape the Canadian software industry and
which should therefore guide any policy decisions.
Beyond these re-affirmations we have seen that the U.S.
model is not a cure-all which should be adopted whole heartedly
without closer examination. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in
2003 released recommendations of a similar nature stating that
consideration of the harm to competition as well as the costs and
benefits of implementation had to be considered before simply
extending the scope of patentable subject matter. The FCC also
advocated for a contextual and economic learning exercise similar to
that which is proposed above and which was undertaken by this
paper.81 The FCC’s recommendations, coming from within the U.S.
which is assumed by most to have an unshakable pro-patent regime,
81
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serve to highlight the fact that software patentability is an ongoing
international debate. The papers examination of the EU model has
also shown that a more limited acceptance of the software patent may
be acceptable – so long as we make the position being adopted clear.
What is principally objectionable is allowing the current state of
uncertainly to prevail due to its wide ranging practical impacts.
The extension of patentability to software may also have
substantial impacts on CIPO. This position was supported by our
exploration of the USPTO’s problems with software patent
examination and over breadth. The resulting emergence of patent
trolls and new market models in response to these problems are issues
which require attention. Klemens suggests that such issues may be
overcome by additional patent requirements within the software
application process including the filing of source code which should
then be searchable by developers – thereby substantially reducing
uncertainty and search costs.82 In addition the problems created by
patent thickets suggest that a new dispute process for patents may
well be justified. In fact, searchable data banks and new dispute
mechanisms might be useful in other patentability fields such as
chemistry or biotechnology. As such software patents need not be a
separate type of patent, but the requirements of usefulness,
inventiveness and novelty may require that we adopt new
documentation and submission policies across the board, or
holistically, in order to accommodate new subject matter.

5.5 Final Concluding Remarks
Obtaining a consensus between the legislature, judiciary and
CIPO on the subject of software patentability is no small objective.
What this paper has hopefully shown is that Canada’s continued
vague and untested approach to software patentability has significant
negative real world impacts. As a growing and important part of
Canada’s economy the software sector requires stable practical
guidance. Through the approach of contextualized research the paper
has overcome the inconclusiveness of theoretical and empirical
research. In addition it has attempted to reconcile and learn from
international approaches. Through this research lens an industrial
environment which supports the non-patentability of software in
82
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Canada has emerged. The final result is both an approach and
justified solution to the policy issues currently facing Canada with
respect to software patentability. The limits of this research have
been made clear, but the effort of this paper was to establish a starting
point for the discussion of this matter in Canada – something which is
notably absent today. In the process it has hopefully also added
substantially to the existing debate and can act as a guide for future
policy decisions in this area of innovation.
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APPENDIX A
Company Profile 1
Basic Profile
The company is involved in the development of banking and wealth
management software. The resulting products are large scale
institutional software programs for investment firms. The company is
privately funded as the side project for a much larger capital
investment firm. Among the firms interviewed its size is moderate
with approximately 80 employees the majority of whom are software
developers. The companies principle clients are in the US.
On Innovation
The company sees itself as a transcriber of well established banking
transaction rules into software. Because of the nature of the generally
accepted nature of these rules it considers itself generally immune
from patent infringement. As a result patents play no negative or
positive role in the companies day-to-day affairs. The company
unhesitatingly responded that with or without software patents in
Canada it would continue to develop software.
On Patent Use
The company holds no patents and has never been sued or approached
regarding patent infringement during its 20 year history. It therefore
saw no use either offensively or defensively for patents in the
software field. When informed that the leading case on business
method patents in the U.S. was related to banking transaction
software the company, though slightly unnerved, dismissed the issue
under the belief that software was not patentable in Canada.83
Lawyers for the company noted this as a risk in the software industry
generally and one which has been discussed with the company but
not pursued.
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On Patent Value
The company perceived no value in software patentability. Lawyers
for the firm did perceive a negative value for the company should it
ever face an infringement claim. With no patent portfolio it would be
unable to cross license and would have to settle or dispute the
infringement claim. Representatives conjectured that the company
would likely cease operations if faced with any substantial patent
lawsuit.
On Patent Cost
Software patents, as of yet, have not cost the company any substantial
legal or licensing fees – though legal staff recognized this as a
substantial area of liability given U.S. trends and the companies
reliance on U.S. clients.
On Education
Lack of education regarding software patents became clear at two
principle levels. First discussion between legal staff and management
for the company was minimal. Furthermore, no discussion between
management and development staff occurred regarding intellectual
property rights and their products. In order to obtain any useful
information regarding patents the author was directed to speak with
the companies outside legal council – no one within the firm felt they
could answer the questions posed.
Summary
Having been in this sector of software development for over 20 years,
the companies general approach is one which is frozen in that history.
Events in the U.S. concerning the core of their business have not been
considered seriously by legal staff or the companies management. At
best this places the company at risk of being pursued for patent
infringement. Though patents do not reduce innovation at this
company on a daily basis licensing or lawsuits could cause the
company to cease its practices entirely. With no intention of
changing its practices the company makes a clear statement in favor of
software non-patentability.
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Company Profile 2
Basic Profile
The firm develops applications for the interactive web 2.0 sphere.
Their principle goal is to create engaging applications that are easy to
use. They distribute their products via telecommunication providers.
The company is just over five years old and though it has proven itself
stable has been looking for investment capital throughout its lifetime.
Employing around 40 individuals it is the smallest and most rapidly
moving company profiled. It holds no patents and has never been
approached regarding licensing or infringement. The company
performs work globally with clients in the EU and US.
On Innovation
The company considers itself a leader in innovative broadband
technologies and device integration. Though it understood the
argument that patents could support innovation it does not operate in
that fashion. Innovation was seen as stemming from the cutting edge
and rapid work of its development staff. This was supported through
income earned by being the first to market with products. Over the
years the company has continually adapted to market changes in
order to keep that edge and to maintain profitability. Without patents
the company stated that it would continue to innovate and develop
software in exactly the same way it does today.
On Patent Use
As innovators the company believed it could respond to patent
infringement claims in one of two ways; either by circumventing the
patent through the use of a different product or programming
approach, or simply by dropping that line of business. As such patents
were of no use either offensively or defensively to the company as
they had no intention of entering into cross licensing agreements.
On Patent Value
The company perceived the value of patents to protect innovation but
felt they were inappropriate for their business model for two reasons.
First, the company felt it didn’t have the time or resources to devote
to patenting its ideas. Second, the patent process represents a time
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hurdle both in terms of preparation and issuance. Being first to
market for the firm was the critical factor in survival and this wasn’t
viewed as meshing well with the patent process.
On Patent Cost
Patent costs to the firm have been minimal. Given their perspective
on the ability to avoid or shed parts of their business that were
infringing patents they also don’t perceive substantial costs arising
from licensing or litigation.
On Education
Management had considered patent and intellectual property issues as
they related to the company, but based on the feeling that patents
were a non-issue had not disseminated information any further. As a
result development staff were not aware of software patent issues – a
concern in cutting edge development where a great deal of code is
open source.
Summary
More than likely this company could continue to operate as it
imagines due to its diverse portfolio of ideas and products. This
therefore directly opposes the theory that patents stimulate
innovation. If anything patents would only cause this company to
drop lines of R&D – not adopt new ones. For a fast moving internet
company patents were not perceived as providing any benefits.
Company Profile 3
Basic Profile
The company has over 3000 employees and is publicly traded and
commercially successful.
It is principally involved in the
development of software tools for developers. As such its investments
in R&D are substantial and deeply technical. The company is based
out of California but after acquiring a smaller start up in Toronto five
years ago it shifted much of it early stage R&D to Canada. The
company holds numerous software and business method patents
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related to its products. It has also been involved in several cross
licensing and settlement related disputes.
On Innovation
Patents are viewed by the company not as something which promotes
innovation but something which allows the company to fortify its
position in the market. The companies nature is to identify business
problems and build solutions to those problems. The overriding
objective and focus is to deliver those solutions to market swiftly patents are an infrequent after-thought.
On Patent Use
Representatives viewed the use of patents as primarily a defensive
exercise in order to establish trading cards for cross licensing and
infringement disputes with competitors and patent trolls.
On Patent Value
The company recognized that patents do enabled them to protect
their R&D investments. However, they did not view patents as a
revenue stream, but rather as an additional layer of armor against
lazier competitors who prefer to imitate rather than to create. They
also acknowledged that patents have a certain marketing value for
customers who appreciate the notion of patented or patent-pending
technology. Patents were viewed more generally as a disruption to
the core business focus of software development.
On Patent Cost
The company had spent a great deal of time streamlining its patent
process in order to reduce application and settlement costs. They did
not believe that these costs had been fully offset by the value to the
company of patents.
Defending against patent infringement
accusations has cost the company substantially both financially and
through lost development time. The costs of patents were therefore
viewed as necessary in the market place – an added cost of doing
business.
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On Education
The company has a well determined policy of informing project and
team managers about patent and intellectual property issues. Team
managers are then responsible for the auditing and validation of R&D
efforts by their team. Team leads said they normally didn’t bother
development staff with IP concerns, but viewed themselves as
involved enough to spot such issues.
Summary
With a department which handles IP issues this company clearly had
the most mature and advanced approach to software patentability.
The company attributed this both to its size as well as it U.S.
ownership and headquarters. Nonetheless, even though it sees itself
as operating within a software patentability regime it generally
disagrees with the burden and cost imposed by such a system. As a
software company it still sees itself as a small company surviving on
rapid innovation and first-to-market successes. Patents, even when
necessary to defend against external forces, were not viewed as fully
functional under such a business model.
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